A Grudging Rescue: France, the Armenians of Cilicia, and the History of Humanitarian Evacuations

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Humanitarian evacuation is today a well-known practice: within three months of unrest breaking out in Libya in spring 2011, for example, the International Organization for Migration oversaw the humanitarian evacuation from the country of some 140,000 "third-country nationals," mostly migrant workers.[1] But it is also a recent phenomenon. As an articulated policy, humanitarian evacuation only really dates back to the Kosovo crisis of the 1990s, when Kosovo Albanian refugees were evacuated from Macedonia. At the time, the United Nations high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), Sadako Ogata, described that evacuation as having "no precedent" in her organization's history.[2]

The UNHCR may not have been involved in an evacuation of this kind before 1999, but there are historical precedents. Humanitarian policy documents on contemporary evacuations sometimes refer in passing to twentieth-century cases, especially ones that targeted children: the Vietnam "babylift" of the children of American servicemen in Vietnam, or the better-known instances of the rescue of Spanish and Jewish children in the late 1930s.[3] In the still quite sparse social science literature on humanitarian evacuation, meanwhile, the evacuation of Kosovo refugees remains one of the best-studied cases and is representative of what that literature does and does not cover. A reasonable body of work covers the evacuees' experiences after their relocation.[4] Their health and wellbeing also rightly receive attention in the medico-social sciences.[5] But the evacuation itself, whether as an episode within a political context, as a logistical operation, or as an experience lived by the evacuees, is not discussed in any detail.[6]

This point holds for research on other cases, in a range of scholarly literature from international relations to social work: the actual process of evacuation figures as a blind spot.[7] A 2002 study of refugee policy in the new century mentions evacuation as part of a "policy toolbox" for responding to refugee crises—citing the Kosovo case as an example—but does not try to explain where this "tool" came from.[8] Nor, like other works, does it give much detail on what actually happened during this or other evacuations.

This begs a set of related questions. How, why, and when did humanitarian evacuation emerge and develop as a practice? In what broader contexts—and for what narrower reasons—did particular evacuations occur? What happened during specific evacuations, and how were they experienced by those who participated in them? History has a disciplinary contribution to make here: these are historical questions; though answering them will be useful not only to researchers in other disciplines but

also to humanitarian practitioners. As Eleanor Davey argues, for practitioners, "humanitarian history can strengthen critical analysis by challenging assumptions and helping to think through complexity."[9] But the rapidly developing field of humanitarian history is yet to systematically address humanitarian evacuations and the complex issues they raise.[10]

The purpose of this essay is to establish humanitarian evacuations as an object of historical enquiry. It does so by contextualizing, narrating, and analyzing one specific case: the evacuation by France of tens of thousands of Armenians from Cilicia, in what is now Turkey, in the last two weeks of 1921. This case is considerably earlier than the historical precedents that are usually cited, especially for a general evacuation rather than one restricted to children. That is significant: it suggests that we must locate the emergence of the practice in the forced displacements of World War I and its aftermath. The political logics at work in this period, by which evacuations became *thinkable*, were not simply humanitarian. Drawing on archival materials from French personnel in the region, in France, and internationally, this essay shows how the decision to evacuate sprang from the interaction of all three contexts, indicating levels of analysis for understanding other evacuations. By discussing the evacuation as a logistical operation, this essay emphasizes the complex bureaucratic apparatus that made it possible—that is, how such an operation became *practicable*—while also showing how that apparatus was working at (if not beyond) its limits.

To this end, the focus here is squarely on the evacuation itself. But an important blind spot remains in the archival record, at least on the French side: very little material directly documents the evacuees' own experiences of the operation. And, indeed, reconstructing what the evacuation meant to them on the basis of the French archives is impossible. Careful attention to the nature of this archival absence offers two important insights. First, this evacuation, like others, was triggered by the actions of the people who would be evacuated. Second, there is a revealing continuity between the documentary record left by a military-colonial administration in the aftermath of World War I and that created by humanitarian organizations in the present: a tendency to exclude the voices of evacuees themselves.

The essay begins by placing the evacuation in the context of the French occupation of, and withdrawal from, Cilicia: a deeply unsettled context for an evacuation that was panicked, hasty, and above all unplanned—little more than a week before it began, the French government was still ruling out any notion of an evacuation. It next explores the reasons that the French changed their mind, before turning to the practicalities of the evacuation itself. Finally, it locates the episode in the larger history of population displacement and draws lessons for understanding the history of humanitarian evacuations.

* * *

The letterheads of early documents of the French High Commission in the Levant refer not to "the states of Syria and Lebanon"—the title that would later become formalized—but to "Syria and Armenia," and then "Syria and Cilicia." The changing title reflects diminishing ambitions. The aspiration to create a larger Armenia under French sway was short-lived, but in the interval between the Ottoman retreat in late

1918 and the beginning of coordinated Turkish nationalist action against the terms of the peace a year later, a French Cilicia briefly became a reality.[11]

Cilicia, Çukurova in modern Turkey, is a region of Anatolia separated from northern Syria by the Amanus Mountains, and from the rest of Anatolia by the Taurus range. Watered by the Seyhan River, the area was agriculturally rich.[12] It was also of great strategic value, as a French deputy would stress when he reminded the prime minister (double-underlining his words for emphasis) that "Cilicia is worth our finest colonies."[13] In 1916, when Britain, France, and Russia agreed to a plan to partition the Ottoman Empire in the event of Allied victory—the Sykes-Picot Agreement—inland Syria, including the cities of Aleppo and Damascus, was merely to be a French "sphere of influence." But Cilicia was allocated to the French as a zone of direct occupation, like the eastern Mediterranean coast from Alexandretta to Tyre.

The area also had a significant Armenian population. It had been the seat of a medieval Armenian kingdom, and Armenians had continued to inhabit the region throughout the Ottoman period. In late Ottoman times it had been the object of Armenian nationalist territorial aspirations, and the scene of large-scale massacres of Armenians.[14] When French forces occupied the area in 1918–1919, they found a population whose Armenian element was much reduced by the genocidal deportations of the war years. Unlike in Syria, where most Ottoman officials had fled with the retreating army in the last months of the war, they also found a functioning Ottoman bureaucracy.[15] Under French occupation, Cilicia became a destination for large numbers of Armenian refugees. Genocide survivors returning from deportation in Syria or Mesopotamia, many of whom hoped to travel on to homes elsewhere, were repatriated under the auspices of the Service for Repatriation and Assistance for Armenians (*Service des rapatriements et de l'assistance pour les Arméniens*).[16] Armenians also arrived from parts of Anatolia outside the French occupation zone, seeking protection from the continuing violence.

Armenians, though, were only part of the population of a diverse province, and, even before the genocide, not the largest part.[17] Rather like the Greek army that invaded western Anatolia at the same time, the French army's push for a militarily defensible frontier left it overextended and in occupation of a zone whose population was too large and, for the most part, too hostile for it to maintain order.[18] Revenge attacks against Muslim Turks by Armenians were common; some of the perpetrators belonged to the French army.[19] Turkish nationalist "Societies for the defence of rights" had existed in the region since the armistice; they were soon involved in armed action. While the French fought a war against the nationalist army along a front running for many kilometres through mountainous country, armed insurgents (*çete*s) within the occupied zone carried out a guerrilla campaign supported from outside by the nationalists. This campaign also targeted Armenian civilians.

By 1920, it was apparent to the French leadership in Paris that the war in Cilicia could not be won: the military task was too great and France's resources too stretched. The Turkish nationalist movement had proved itself capable of blocking Allied plans for Anatolia, and French *dirigeants* gradually concluded that a peace accord would better serve French interests: it would permit a rebooting of France's diplomatic and commercial relationship with the Ottoman Empire's successor state, and stabilize the

situation in Syria. The French parliament had expressed a desire to end the war in June 1920, and an abortive accord was negotiated in London in March 1921; but it was not until October that year that a working agreement was reached by the French envoy Henry Franklin-Bouillon, brokered directly with the nationalist leadership in Ankara.[20] By this time, the Greek advance had been broken, and the nationalists' negotiating position was much stronger.[21] Under the terms of the agreement, French forces would withdraw over eight weeks in November and December, handing Cilicia over to Ankara's representatives in an orderly manner.

The logistics of the withdrawal were complex. As well as redeploying or disbanding the army of occupation, the French had to negotiate the return of several hundred prisoners-of-war, releasing hundreds of nationalist prisoners in exchange.[22] Local employees of the occupation authorities, whose position with the new authorities may have been compromised, had to be paid (up to November 30) and authorized to depart for Syria.[23] The army was also concerned for its dead: the French military cemetery at Aintab (modern Gaziantep) was vandalized twice in November 1921, a humiliating symbolic attack on the retreating army about which they could only protest to the incoming Turkish officials.[24] As this case of vandalism suggests, events on the ground remained unruly, despite the diplomatic agreement: *çete* attacks continued against the French, who suspected—plausibly enough—that the nationalists were instigating them to keep up the pressure on France, even as they made a public show of cooperation.[25]

Then there was the question of materiel. Artillery, encampments, military vehicles, some seven thousand horses, and "very considerable quantities" of barbed wire all had to be disposed of.[26] Leaving all this to an army the French had just finished fighting—and might have to fight again—raised many questions. The nationalists were still fighting a war with Greece, and the Allies had agreed not to provide military equipment directly to either belligerent.[27] In the end, the French ceded some materiel directly, some indirectly, and withdrew the rest: six hundred tonnes by sea from Mersin and over five thousand tonnes by rail from Dörtyol by November 23.[28] The penultimate issue of their official newspaper, the *Courrier d'Adana*, advertised a fire-sale auction of paint, beds, ironware, and other goods belonging to the army.[29]

Such was the chaotic context of the French withdrawal. I have sketched it in some detail because, by definition, humanitarian evacuations are influenced by the tense and fast-changing situations in which they take place. Notable here is the gulf that had opened, by October 1921, between French military personnel on the ground and the civilian leadership in Paris and its diplomatic envoy in the region. Officers in Cilicia had been fighting the Turkish nationalists; to an extent, despite the truce, they still were. Suspicious of Ankara, and prone to viewing the failure of the occupation as a failure of political will on the part of their own government, these officers were also close witnesses to the impact of the 1915 genocide, and more recent attacks and massacres by nationalist troops and *çetes* on Armenians in Cilicia and beyond. This did not inevitably make them actively *pro*-Armenian; they had also experienced serious difficulties governing an Armenian population that was by no means a docile client.

The French government, meanwhile, needing to consider both the wider diplomatic balance of forces and France's own battered, bankrupt, and war-weary

condition, was committed to making peace with Ankara. The foreign ministry came to suspect both Armenian leaders and French officers of deliberately attempting to sabotage the peace accord; Franklin-Bouillon, in particular, was prickly with suspicion as he travelled around the region. General Gouraud, the French high commissioner in Beirut, had the thankless task of communicating unwanted information upward to his superiors, and unwanted orders downward to his subordinates.

This gulf helps explain the events surrounding the evacuation in several ways. It surely entered into Armenians' calculations as they weighed their options and, ignoring the admonitions of the French government, began to flee Cilicia as soon as the handover period began. It helps explain why French personnel on the ground did so little to stop them, despite their orders. Exacerbating the chaotic circumstances of the withdrawal, it contributed to the pervasive sense of loss of control that characterizes much of the French documentation on this episode, and helps us understand its paranoid tone. Above all, it explains why French policy went into paralysis in the face of these events: the French government was already disinclined to trust what its own men on the ground—and they were all men—were telling it.

* * *

On November 9, 1921, Gouraud issued a proclamation announcing the forthcoming handover of power in Cilicia. It built up to an appeal to "all good citizens" not to flee—an appeal that was clearly aimed at some "citizens" in particular, since he also asserted that "the French government has done what is necessary to safeguard the rights of minorities." Leaving, he continued, would be nothing more than a "disastrous adventure to which no happy outcome can be seen."[30]

But an Armenian exodus from Cilicia was already happening.[31] Gouraud certainly did not believe his own words: he had already warned his superiors that most of Cilicia's Armenians would leave with the departing French troops.[32] His subordinate Dufieux, commanding the army of occupation in Cilicia, had been thoroughly disillusioned about the French withdrawal for even longer. Ordered by Gouraud on November 2 to prevent Armenians from crossing the new border ("without of course going as far as violence"), Dufieux refused. "I will do the impossible to persuade these populations to remain in Cilicia," he wrote, "but I will not employ force to obtain this result." Dufieux had clearly stated, months earlier, what guarantees were necessary for Armenians in Cilicia—guarantees that did not feature in the Ankara Accord. He announced the accord as ordered, "add[ing] to it the meagre arguments at my disposal to reassure the populations." But, partly as a safety valve to prevent popular fears from spilling over into mass flight or violent unrest, he continued to issue laissez-passer to Armenians wanting to leave.[33]

Meanwhile, Gouraud himself continued to tell the ministry that the exodus was unavoidable; this was the overwhelming impression of his officers on the ground, and not just Dufieux, who resigned on November 25.[34] That day, Gouraud wrote to Paris that "All the information I receive from Cilicia, and notably that brought back by Admiral Grandclément, returned from Adana, confirms that, from the beginning, the Christian population was irrevocably decided to abandon the country before the

return of the Turks."[35] Some 2,600 had already managed to enter Syria over mountain tracks by the end of November.[36]

The French government, then, did not lack evidence of what was happening. By late November, it was also clear that the measures taken to stop the exodus had only encouraged it. Every restriction that had been tried—limiting the number of laissez-passer to one thousand per day, refusing to lay on special trains, limiting the number of tickets available, refusing further entries into Syria—only spurred more people to leave, and faster, before options were reduced any further.[37] But senior figures in Paris continued to insist, into early December, that Armenians had no need to leave.

By then, perhaps half the Armenian population of Cilicia had already left, along with a fairly large number of other people who preferred not to live under rule from Ankara. Most aimed for parts of the eastern Mediterranean that remained under foreign control: Palestine, Cyprus, or Egypt, all ruled by Britain; Smyrna, then occupied by Greece; or Constantinople, under a joint Allied occupation. Almost all Armenians still in the province were gathered either at the port of Mersin or at Dörtyol, the railway town near the border with the mandate territories.[38] Unable to leave—they lacked the resources of those who had already departed—they simply waited. Their calm but expectant presence at these gathering-points placed significant moral pressure on Paris. French personnel on the ground seemed noticeably ready to transmit this pressure directly to their superiors. Without lobbying openly on the Armenians' behalf, neither Gouraud in Beirut nor any of his men in Cilicia appears to have proposed any action to disperse the assembled refugees.

The incident that broke this impasse did not occur in Cilicia itself, nor in Paris, but off Alexandria, when the British authorities refused to allow entry to 345 Armenians aboard the *Pomone*—an elderly, overcrowded freighter that lacked adequate lifeboats and safety equipment as well as the stipulated amount of airspace for its passengers. When the refugees aboard were refused entry to Egypt, they took matters into their own hands and seized control of the ship. Refusing to be returned to Cilicia, they insisted that they be taken to Lebanon and Syria.[39]

The resolution of this incident also triggered a resolution to the crisis as a whole. On December 4, 1921, the foreign ministry instructed Gouraud that the *Pomone* be allowed entry to the mandate territories.[40] After another few days—around the same time that the Allied high commissioners at Constantinople declared that that city would also be closed to refugees from Cilicia—Syria and Lebanon were opened to all the refugees at Mersin and Dörtyol. And by the middle of the month, senior French officials finally accepted that French responsibility for the refugees extended to evacuating them. Franklin-Bouillon, who had negotiated the agreement with Ankara and who had repeatedly insisted that the Armenians stay, wrote to the ministry on December 10 that there was now no choice but to evacuate those who remained.[41] This telegram reached Paris via Beirut on December 13; on the same day, Robert de Caix, secretary-general of the High Commission at Beirut, outlined a plan for the refugees' evacuation and resettlement in Syria. The choice was "between organizing the emigration . . . or washing our hands of the Christians determined to leave the territories handed back to the Turks, which is morally impossible." Aristide Briand,

serving as both foreign minister and prime minister, accepted his plan the following day.[42]

What caused this change of mind in Paris, after weeks of paralysis? The discussion here will focus on three areas. First, regional factors, including the closure of alternative destinations and Gouraud's assessment of risks to the stability of French rule in the Levant. Second, the constellation of diplomatic and public advocacy on behalf of the Armenians that constructed French responsibility for them—that *made* it "morally impossible," as de Caix wrote, to abandon them. Third, the pressure created by refugees' own actions—again indicated, in a different way, by the *Pomone* incident. The first two are easy to read in the French sources, the third less so.

In the eastern Mediterranean, the first weeks of the handover period saw alternative destinations close, from Palestine to Constantinople. The mutiny aboard the *Pomone* demonstrated that other destinations would refuse entry to refugees from Cilicia even if they were gathered offshore by the shipload. It also made clear that this was France's problem: the British authorities in Egypt refused not only to allow any more Armenians in, but also to intervene on the *Pomone* itself.[43] It was left to the French representatives in Alexandria and Cairo, and ultimately the ministry of foreign affairs itself, to find a solution. They did, by ordering Gouraud to accept the refugees into Syria.

Viewing matters from Beirut, Gouraud had a clear sense that it was in France's interests in the region to accept, and assist, the Armenians of Cilicia. Failing to do so would undermine France's credibility as a protector of Christians in Syria and Lebanon, on whom French rule depended heavily. As he said in one of several forceful telegrams to the ministry on November 25, the ongoing exodus from the city of Adana would "serve to discredit us in all the Christian milieux of the Orient, to which we will be denounced as abandoning our traditional role." Though he was still preventing unauthorized ship-borne refugees from landing at Beirut, this message stressed that repelling refugees by force was unthinkable. Moreover, if refugees were turned back, they would only join those gathered at Mersin, or "would enter Syria anyway, exhausted, having passed by convoluted routes."[44] In other words, without a planned and timely evacuation, the Armenians would run for the Syrian border anyway, and arrive in a much worse condition. Hasty though it was, the grudging rescue of the refugees at Mersin and Dörtyol meant that they arrived in Syria in fairly good health, and with a surprising proportion of their material possessions intact. When a similar number of Anatolian Christian refugees entered Syria on foot in small groups the following year, after the final defeat of the Greek army, they required much more basic relief and medical attention.[45]

The long, frequent, and urgent telegrams that Gouraud was sending to Paris by late November also clearly communicated that France bore a wider moral responsibility for the fate of the Armenians. Also on November 25, for example, he argued in favour of allowing an American-run orphanage at Urfa (housing seven hundred orphans) to be transferred into Syria: "Despite difficulty transport and disadvantage of installing a new American orphanage in our zone, I believe there would be serious moral disadvantages to opposing this, and I propose, barring contrary instruction Y.E. [Your Excellency] to give my authorisation."[46]

Gouraud was not the only person applying moral pressure to the Quai d'Orsay: his moral argument resonated with a much broader discourse of French moral responsibility for Cilicia's Armenians. Messages reached the French foreign ministry from an array of Armenian, French, and foreign actors, by many different routes. The British government had been receiving messages from Armenian figures, and forwarding them to the Quai d'Orsay, as far back as April 1921.[47] As the handover period began, the French ambassador in London carefully observed reactions in Britain, suggesting that Paris stress the protection of ethnic and religious minorities—"one of the ideas that the average English sentimentality most willingly welcomes"—in Cilicia.[48] Ambassadors in Greece and Switzerland similarly monitored the local press.[49] The French minister to Greece also reported his suspicion that "the Armenian colony of Athens, doubtless at the instigation of certain Greek functionaries, may have telegraphed president Harding to warn him that France is leaving the Armenians (of) Cilicia without protection and to implore the help of the United States."[50] From Rome, the Holy See, too, expressed its concern, and its desire to see proper guarantees for the safety of Cilicia's Christians.[51]

Around the time of the *Pomone* incident, meanwhile, a minor diplomatic spat occurred when Belgium put the question of Cilicia's Christians on the agenda for a meeting of the League of Nations Council in Geneva. This drew sharp words from Briand. The Belgian foreign minister quickly assured the French ambassador that Belgium would follow the French line; his government had only taken this step to avert an intended "declaration to Christendom" by the influential cardinal Mercier. The Belgian government was also under pressure from local philarmenian groups.[52]

Armenians in and beyond the eastern Mediterranean articulated their own claims on France in this context, including requests for assistance in leaving Cilicia. On November 8, a group of Armenians at Larnaca in Cyprus wrote a telegram of warning: "Imminent evacuation Cilicia French troops handover to Kemalists presage atrocities total obliteration Christian populations guarantees vague promises minorities cannot safeguard lives and goods [of] Armenians who address last desperate appeal and beg *facilitate emigration*."[53] Their message reached the ministry via the Armenian National Delegation in Paris, but the authors were themselves probably recent refugees from Cilicia. On the same day, Monsignor Nazlian, vicar of the Armenian Catholic patriarchate in Allied-occupied Constantinople, visited Pellé, the French ambassador there. Nazlian made several demands on behalf of Cilician Armenians of all denominations, insisting particularly on French support for the expatriation of Christians wishing to leave Cilicia, and for their settlement in Syria.[54]

External actors of all kinds—from private individuals to foreign governments, from Armenian groups elsewhere to the Council of the League of Nations, from French parliamentarians to the Pope—intervened on behalf of the Armenians of Cilicia. Their interventions ranged from simply expressing concern to making detailed and specific demands. What mattered more than any individual intervention was how, in aggregate, they made clear to French leaders that an interested and influential public, at home and internationally, would pay close attention to whatever happened during and after the handover—and be ready to hold France responsible. The French

took such pressure seriously; correspondence on the issue, for example between Paris and Beirut, was routinely copied to French representatives in multiple other locations including London, Geneva, Constantinople, Cairo, Athens, Rome, and Washington.

If we wish to understand what might induce a state to carry out a humanitarian evacuation, then, this instance provides two obvious levels of analysis. On the one hand, there is old-fashioned realpolitik. Paris had reckoned up France's balance of interests and come to terms with Ankara; eventually, it also accepted Gouraud's assessment of what the consequences in the Levant would be, and how France must respond to an incipient humanitarian emergency. On the other hand, there is the argument of moral responsibility. Here, we can identify the publics among whom there developed a modern "humanitarian imagination," in Keith Watenpaugh's useful term, with Cilicia's Armenians as its object. We can see how support for them was mobilized through media ranging from pamphlets to prayers, and political pressure applied on their behalf.[55] This sense of responsibility, discussed in more detail below, was part of what made the evacuation thinkable.

More important than both of these, though, was the agency of the refugees themselves. The capacity to act is harder to "see" in the archives, for the very image of the refugee—then as now—operates to conceal it. Refugees typically appear in the discourse of both states and humanitarian organizations as passive, needy, and helpless, and the Cilician case shows how this discourse inscribes itself into the archive.[56] From the French sources, we can see how policy was formed in a dialogue among the foreign ministry in Paris, its mission to the nascent League of Nations, and the High Commission in Beirut. We can also see evidence that policy decisions were influenced by pressure from other states as well as certain private groups and individuals in France and abroad. But the refugees themselves do not feature as interlocutors, even in the High Commission records; the archives I have consulted contain little material generated by refugees, and none documenting negotiations between them and the French.[57] The structure of the archive works to create the impression that French policy toward the refugees was decided among French officials then applied to the refugees, as submissive objects, by fiat.[58]

At the same time, though, the *contents* of the archive provide ample evidence to suggest that the single most important factor driving French policy was what the refugees themselves were doing. It is true enough to see this population as characterized by intense human need, but it was neither passive nor helpless. The mutiny on the *Pomone* demonstrates as much, as does the departure of over thirty thousand Armenians from Cilicia by themselves. Almost as many made their way to Mersin and Dörtyol, where their gathering and waiting placed an irresistible moral pressure on the withdrawing imperial power. Refugees are frightening to states precisely because they are not helpless, but rather political agents in their own right. French official sources betray this fear of refugee agency in their shrill insistence that the Armenians should stay in Cilicia: that is, passively accept the fate decided for them, rather than take actions that might upset the Franco-Turkish agreement. They show it more visibly still in their attribution of blame for the exodus to external actors, whether disloyal French personnel on the ground, shadowy Armenian nationalist committees,

foreign powers (especially Britain), or even coalitions of the above—like the "Anglo-Greco-Armenian agents" blamed by French intelligence services in Constantinople for propelling the exodus.[59]

This conspiratorial thinking was not entirely groundless: many other actors had a stake in the postwar settlement in the eastern Mediterranean, and the interests of Britain, Greece, or Armenian nationalist groups did not necessarily align with those of France. But blaming the exodus on these external actors—perceiving, as Dzovinar Kévonian puts it, a "vast international plot directed against France"—denied the obvious.[60] Long before the Franklin-Bouillon accord was belatedly publicized in the region, Armenians in Cilicia recognized that the French military occupation had had its day and that Paris was looking for a way out. The eight-week handover period provided adequate time to ensure that they were leaving with at least some of their belongings. That Armenians in the region would not wish to remain under Turkish nationalist authority should have been evident, even without the massacres of Armenians that accompanied nationalist advances in Marash and Hadjin (modern-day Kahramanmaraş and Saimbeyli) in 1920–1. Kévonian rightly calls the exodus "a foreseeable humanitarian catastrophe" that can be understood by "the simple history of the years of war and occupation."[61] But in the conspiratorial mindset of some French officials, the fact that virtually all the Armenians in the province had left their homes was taken as proof that their departure must have been externally planned; the calm way in which they had departed, even gathering their belongings first, was presented as conclusive. As the handover period progressed, such thinking mutated into a widespread fear that armed Armenians would seize Dörtyol as French troops withdrew and either establish an Armenian enclave or force the redrawing of the new border to include the town in Syria.[62] Either way, the smooth establishment of diplomatic ties between France and the new Turkey would be sabotaged. Refugees' actions would block the designs of states.

* * *

Despite the paralysis that had delayed it, and the paranoia that accompanied it, once the decision to evacuate the remaining Armenians from Cilicia was taken it was executed with impressive speed. The evacuation took little more than two weeks: all the time that remained before the final French withdrawal. When General Dufieux announced the Franklin-Bouillon accord in Adana on November 2, he explicitly told Christian leaders that "No special trains will be provided, no boats will be chartered by the French authorities for emigrants."[63] But that is exactly how this hurried—but, given the circumstances, orderly—mass transfer was carried out: by trains, and by chartered boats.

In mid-December, de Caix estimated the number of refugees gathered at the Dörtyol railhead at seven or eight thousand.[64] They were not travelling light. In late December, a French officer reported that the railway station was "encumbered with materials of every kind, a real encampment is installed around it, the Armenians are carrying everything away, bedding, planks, tiles."[65] The head of the joint Franco-Turkish committee overseeing the withdrawal had earlier received reports indicating that departing Armenians were "demolishing their houses in order to remove the

construction timber" and given orders—seemingly unsuccessful—that such destruction should stop.[66] Both men took such preparations as evidence that the exodus had been planned and coordinated by Armenian nationalist groups acting against French interests. The foreign ministry later put the total number of refugees who had arrived overland at about twelve thousand.[67]

A larger number still was gathered at Mersin, and a much fuller documentary record of that group's actual evacuation survives. The High Commission chartered several large ships from the Compagnie des Messageries maritimes, who operated a rapid relay to carry some 16,500 Armenians by sea to the Syrian and Lebanese coast.[68] These vessels dwarfed the *Pomone*: the *Valetta* carried 1,511 refugees on its sailing from Mersin on the evening of December 18, when the *Copenhague* was already docked and expecting to embark 2,500; the *Algérien* and *Black Prince* were due to arrive in the following days, with a capacity of 2,500 and 3,000 passengers, respectively.[69] These refugees, too, brought their belongings with them. The French foreign ministry claimed that the docks at Beirut alone, where 10,500 refugees disembarked, handled 25,000 cubic metres of "packages and bundles of every sort"—nearly 2.5 cubic metres per person, the equivalent of two very large crates. This baggage, which included "carpets, blankets, mattresses, etc.," was given a sanitary inspection, while the refugees themselves were "automatically showered, deloused, and vaccinated on their arrival" and their clothes steamed.[70]

This seaborne operation was far from haphazard. The refugees were assembled into groups of around fifty, with a number and a nominal head for ease of organization. A document like a passenger manifest was completed for each of these, detailing its composition by family group, each listed under the name of its head, whose occupation was also recorded. So was the number of people in each family, though quite a few consisted of only one person. The family head was usually a man, though sometimes a woman, in which case the occupation was often left blank or recorded as "widow." There was a "comments" column, mainly used to note the number of young children in each group (who may not have been included in the total number of persons). The final group, whose departure was dated December 28, 1921, was larger than most: it numbered ninety-one people, with the handwritten note "embarked at last moment—expatriated fr [*sic*] political reasons." There were a few anomalous groups: about 350 from Mesopotamia, *Assyro-chaldéens* according to annotations in blue pencil, evacuated to Homs via Tripoli in 7 groups of about 50 each; over 300 orphans and assorted carers from an orphanage run by the Armenian General Benevolent Union, all named individually.[71]

These documents are a snapshot of the evacuation in progress. (I have not found any planning documents.) The picture they allow us to draw offers insights into humanitarian evacuations more generally. A key point is the development of logistical techniques and their application for humanitarian purposes. In this instance, the immediate antecedents would be the techniques of transfer used by the *Service des rapatriements*, and their likely origin in the French state's military transportation techniques of the years 1914–1918. Beyond the French case, while the war and its aftermath witnessed forced displacement on a gigantic scale, they also saw the development of practices of nonviolent long-range population transfer, for example in the postwar

exchanges of prisoners-of-war and interned civilians, which affected hundreds of thousands of people. These, not coincidentally, were coordinated by the future high commissioner for refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, who was praised not only for the diplomatic skill with which he negotiated them, but also for raising the money to cover the cost from voluntary contributions.[72] Such techniques were what made evacuations practicable.

These techniques cannot be separated from the development of modern bureaucratic states, and in fact everything about the surviving archival record remains fundamentally "state-centric." It is a striking feature of the evacuation, and the broader exodus of Armenians, that the refugees never left the encompassing matrix of the modern state bureaucracy—even though the state authority concerned not only had a formal policy of encouraging them to stay, but was also in the process of dismantling itself. Those who quit Cilicia under their own steam during November departed with their papers in order, bearing laissez-passer issued and duly stamped by French officials: 39,377 of them, including about four thousand non-Armenians.[73] (Not everyone bearing a laissez-passer had the means to leave in November: there is some overlap between this figure and the total of those evacuated later.) Those who were evacuated were bureaucratically managed on a grand scale, as the passenger documents indicate. Beneath the stamp of the French officer in charge, Lieutenant Gagneux, these include a list of recipients. Each stamped form that remains in the diplomatic archives at Nantes—over 260 of them for the main body of refugees at Mersin—once existed in ten copies, distributed to different civilian and military branches of the French administrations in Cilicia and Beirut as well as the head of each group, the ship's captain, and the Messageries maritimes.

The information recorded on these forms proffers a sense of what mattered to the French authorities—and, indeed, to any state in the postwar order that was taking shape under the management of the League of Nations. Listed at the head of each document, along with a note that "those concerned have been warned that they travel at their own risk and peril," was the point of origin of each group and, perhaps more important, their destination in the mandate territories. "The absorptive capacities of the different localities or regions of Syria and Lebanon were studied in minute detail [*furent minutieusement étudiées*]," reported the foreign ministry, in terms very characteristic of the League. From their arrival points, the refugees were transported to their final destinations in secondary convoys by sea, rail, or truck. "This system of dispersal," the foreign ministry report continued, "besides the facilities it offered from the point of view of work, also had the advantage of avoiding large concentrations [of refugees] which might have serious drawbacks from the economic and social point of view."[74]

In the postwar world, massively expanded state intervention in social and economic life had made "economic viability" a key measure of new states' fitness for independence, and economic stewardship was part of the rhetorical justification for mandatory rule. Knowing the occupations of the evacuees, or the number of dependent children, would allow the French to manage their integration into the mandatory economy; orphans were perhaps listed individually because they were more likely to become an individual responsibility of the mandatory authorities, whereas

family groups were the responsibility of the head of the family. The financial cost of the evacuation was also a prominent concern. Beneath the list of families were details of the payment made to cover the cost of their transportation. Usually the refugees paid their own way, at sixty francs each. Sometimes the costs were borne by Armenian organizations or by the French themselves, in which case there is an explanatory note: "indigent" for the former, for example, or "ex-gendarmes" for the latter.

The very visible regime of medical surveillance of the evacuees noted at Beirut, which extended to other ports, similarly fits within a history of augmented state intervention in public and private life. In the first instance, medical surveillance was intended to reassure both the mandatory authorities and the local population that the refugees would not bring disease with them; there had been some recent cases of smallpox in Cilicia.[75] More largely, it reflects an expanded state concern with disease control, and a consequent medicalization of migration.

As such wholly "state" sources, the passenger documents afford some analysis of the refugees as a population, in the sense of the term that Foucault outlines in "Governmentality": that is, a statistically knowable object of government.[76] But these materials tell us nothing about how the evacuation was experienced by the evacuees themselves.

* * *

The foreign ministry's reports to the League on the refugees' rapid integration are bland, upbeat, and brief. They are hard to check against the records of the High Commission. Quite detailed sources survive for the evacuation itself, but the operation to receive and disperse them in the mandate territories was carried out by the Service d'Hygiène et d'Assistance publique, one of the most important mandatory agencies, whose archives are missing.[77] But, among the total population of Armenian refugees in the mandate territories, it is likely that the evacuees were rehabilitated—to use the terminology of a slightly later period—fairly quickly, and that the aim of limiting French financial responsibility for them was achieved as abruptly as possible; as we have seen, in most cases, the refugees even paid the cost of their own transportation, though at a low fare. One thing about their resettlement in the mandate territories deserves note, though. Apart from routine political temperature-taking by the French intelligence services, the populations of Lebanon and Syria do not appear to have been consulted in any way about the process. This would set a precedent for the 1920s and '30s, making refugee settlement a politically contentious issue throughout the mandate period.[78]

The exodus of Armenians from Cilicia is part of a longer and larger history of population displacement and state formation in the Middle East and in the world. Over the last fifteen years or so, historians of Europe have begun to recognize the importance of this history, especially for understanding the deeply unsettled periods that followed both world wars, and have adopted the "itinerant perspective" of the refugee to explore it.[79] Other episodes of mass displacement elsewhere in the world, such as south and east Asia, have generated an increasingly large and sophisticated body of scholarship.[80] The development of the field means that the global history of refugees is being brought within one analytical frame.[81] Historians of the Middle East

are also beginning to add to that literature, in ways that deepen our understanding of the region's past and present while enriching, and also challenging, the emerging narrative of global refugee history.[82]

In the case at hand, the flight of Armenians from Cilicia as the modern Turkish Republic took shape is a clear instance of what Aristide Zolberg calls "the formation of new states as a refugee-generating process."[83] But it is also an outcome of developments over the previous half century that turn Zolberg's formulation around: late Ottoman state-building was deeply influenced by the arrival of, and need to provide for, Muslim refugees forced out of the Caucasus or breakaway states in the Balkans. Modern Turkish nationalism, a "haven nationalism," owed much to these migrations.[84] So did the empire's increasing suspicion of its remaining Christian populations and the resulting "population politics" of the late imperial and early Republican periods, which during World War I went as far as genocidal massacres and deportations.[85] The former Young Turks fighting the French in 1919–1921 had a vision of Anatolia that had no place for Christians, and the Armenians of Cilicia knew it. French officers also assumed, at the start of their occupation of Cilicia, that the region's near future would involve further mass migrations—but of different people.[86]

If the preemptive flight of Cilicia's Armenians has many precedents and parallels in the region and beyond, the operation to evacuate nearly half of them is different. Analyzing it suggests ways to address the history of humanitarian evacuations more generally, in terms of establishing a chronology, understanding specific cases, and approaching sources. It also raises many questions that warrant exploration.

The evacuation of December 1921 was earlier and less selective than the evacuations of children that are most often mentioned as early examples. Tracking evacuations chronologically matters, not simply in a descriptive sense, nor in the unilluminating search for the "first" instance of a given phenomenon, but because it helps us understand the context in which the practice of humanitarian evacuation emerged and the political logics that underpinned it. It suggests that we situate the practice in the era of mass repatriations of prisoners-of-war, and repatriation and resettlement of refugees. The episode occurred on the cusp of the emergence of international institutions to manage such mass population transfers: after Fridtjof Nansen began negotiating prisoner-of-war repatriations on behalf of the new League of Nations, but before he was appointed high commissioner for refugees or proposed the population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

As working hypotheses for further research, I would argue that humanitarian evacuation on this scale became thinkable because mass population displacement had been normalized, and became practicable through the development of military logistical techniques (tested in the mass troop movements of the World War I era) and their application to humanitarian purposes in the post-war activities of the *Service des rapatriements*.[87] We can see material examples of this in the use of Indian Army infantry tents to house nearly fifty thousand Christian refugees from Anatolia and the Caucasus in a camp at Baquba near Baghdad run by the British military in 1918–1921, or in the loan to Nansen of tents left at Salonica by the demobilising French expeditionary force in Macedonia for housing Asia Minor refugees at the end of the Greek-Turkish

war.[88] How these techniques and the responsibility for employing them were transmitted from national militaries to humanitarian agencies and international organizations, especially after 1945, remains to be investigated. In any case, its ostensibly humanitarian aims should not mask the Cilician evacuation's uncomfortably close relationship with wartime and postwar deportations and expulsions. It does not contradict Keith Watenpaugh's bleak but well-grounded observation that "humanitarian" transfer benefits the powerful and rewards the perpetrators of violence.[89]

Placing this evacuation in the context of other contemporary state-directed population transfers also raises the question of what is specific about humanitarian evacuation. In place and time, the closest parallel to the Cilician evacuation is probably the Allied rescue, in 1915, of several thousand Armenians besieged by Ottoman forces at Musa Dagh, on the gulf of Alexandretta.[90] But that was a wartime rescue, and although they included men, women, and children, the Armenians involved were engaged in armed resistance against the Ottoman state. They were rescued by belligerents fighting that state; many of the men would later serve in the French armed forces. Military imperatives, in other words, were at work alongside humanitarian ones. The same goes for British and French involvement in the evacuation of White Russian soldiers, accompanied by many civilians, earlier in 1921—which was also partly a self-evacuation, General Wrangel's forces in the Crimea being transported on the ships of the imperial Black Sea fleet.[91] The ongoing cost of supporting Russian refugees in the Straits zone was certainly on French officials' minds as they argued that Cilicia's Armenians should stay where they were.[92]

Despite a family resemblance to these other evacuations, though, the Cilician case lacks the immediate military element, and therefore appears more "purely" humanitarian. One might be tempted to argue that it represents a distinctive step toward modern humanitarian practice—but if this is true, it only highlights how often that practice has remained beholden, if not to immediate military necessity, then certainly to wider strategic and diplomatic imperatives. The Kosovo evacuation responded to NATO's strategic interest in relieving the pressure placed on Macedonia by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees, and—less concretely but just as importantly—the alliance's need to preserve its moral authority internationally.[93]

All of these examples raise the issue of responsibility. British and French support for the White side in the Russian Civil War left British and French policymakers with a sense of responsibility, however grudging, for their defeated allies. In Kosovo, NATO came under pressure because its bombing campaign had sharply exacerbated the refugee crisis.[94] The Cilician case helps us understand how such responsibility is constructed by public pressure, mobilized through and brought to bear by specific organizations, amplified by the media of the time, or channelled through influential interlocutors like the Belgian cardinal, Mercier. Newspaper articles, books, posters, homilies, politicians' speeches, and official reports had all diffused a humanitarian concern for Ottoman Christians among European and North American publics in recent decades.[95] Now, church-based, philarmenian, and other voluntary organizations as well as prominent individuals and Armenian diaspora organizations acted to put pressure on governments and the new League of Nations to intervene on behalf of the Armenians in Cilicia. The archival traces left by that pressure suggest that it mattered

to the French, but just how much—relative, say, to a concern for political stability in the mandate territories—remains moot. Future research on other cases may be able to judge the weight of responsibility more precisely.

A contemporary comparison also suggests that when states can evade such responsibility, they will. When the Turkish nationalist army entered Smyrna in September 1922, tens of thousands of mostly Greek Orthodox refugees met the violent fate that Cilicia's Armenians had feared—an outcome aggravated by the fact that this was a conquest in the midst of war, not a handover (however chaotic) following a truce. Whereas the French occupation authorities in Cilicia were withdrawing from an armed ceasefire, the Greek occupation authorities in Smyrna were fleeing catastrophic military defeat, their soldiers in almost as desperate a state as the Anatolian Christians fleeing along-side them. The civilian refugees were much more numerous, while the capacities of the occupying power were much weaker. As for the foreign powers whose representatives watched the city burn from ships in the harbour, no single one of them would be considered responsible for the fate of its inhabitants—so none of them took responsibility. When it finally began, the evacuation of refugees was almost as rapid as the evacuation from Cilicia and an order of magnitude larger. But it came too late, and it started as a private initiative of Asa Jennings, an American working for the YMCA in Smyrna, who essentially shamed several governments into action.[96]

Comparing Smyrna and Cilicia suggests that understanding a decision to evacuate (or not) a population in distress requires an analysis of how "responsibility" for that population is constructed. Here, again, the question of what happened after 1945, when it became easier for responsibility to be shifted onto international organizations, deserves attention. But a sense of responsibility is not enough in itself. As I have stressed, agency also lay with the Cilician Armenians themselves: all the states concerned, and especially France, were reacting to their concrete refusal to accept the part allocated to them in Franklin-Bouillon's diplomacy. The French foreign ministry could have ignored any number of letters from the Vatican, but it could not ignore tens of thousands of Armenians gathered at Mersin and Dörtyol, or the hundreds of mutineers on the *Pomone*.[97]

It is the letters from the Vatican, though, that ended up in the French archives. Reflecting on what those archives contain, and what they do not, offers other lessons for understanding humanitarian evacuations. First, the prevalence of "state" voices in the archive suggests that evacuations primarily serve the interests of states, not of the people being evacuated. Certainly, the marginalization of refugee voices in the archive indicates that their interests came a distant second to those of the French state. The archive only implicitly demonstrates that the Armenians were the main drivers of the decision to evacuate. But the French refusal to listen to refugee voices had its own effect on the events of late 1921. Ronald Perry, who has worked extensively on evacuations in the aftermath of disasters, makes the point that disaster victims "typically act rationally, given the limited information they have about the situation. They do not flee in panic, wander aimlessly in shock or comply docilely with the recommendations of authorities. Instead, victims are likely to make their own decisions about whether and when to evacuate."[98] He could be describing the Cilician Armenians facing the political disaster of the French withdrawal. If French decision-makers had consulted

the Armenians and planned accordingly, their response might have been less panicked, suspicious, and belated.

This is a final lesson of the case, not just for historians but also for those involved in planning evacuations in the present. There is still today a strong, and perhaps hard to avoid, tendency for agencies working with refugees—governmental, nongovernmental, or international—to prioritize their own bureaucratic needs and those of similar organizations, and to run into problems as a result. For example, the independent review of the operations of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees during the Kosovo crisis, including the humanitarian evacuation programme, consulted well over 150 bureaucratic offices—of ministries, NGOs, international organizations—in ten countries. But, notwithstanding a note in the terms of reference that "During field visits, the views of refugees and former refugees will be solicited," there appears to have been no formal mechanism for incorporating and learning from the experiences of refugees themselves.[99] More recently, the International Organization for Migration's three-month report on its response to the 2011 Libyan crisis includes a section with half a dozen short "personal stories," but these are purely descriptive; there is no evidence that the testimony of these or other evacuees informed the organization's evaluation of the operation.[100] Only two of them even include direct quotations.

For a historian studying the Cilician case, French state sources can help us understand the political decision to carry out the evacuation. They document it as a bureaucratic and logistical operation, from the point of view of those who planned and executed it. But they offer little or no purchase for a full investigation of the experience of evacuation itself. Nowhere among them is the evacuees' own experience recorded. To understand what such events meant to the evacuees, historians would need to look to the much more fragmentary, dispersed, and multilingual refugee archive: private papers, for example, or published or unpublished memoirs. For humanitarian practitioners hoping to learn from the past, meanwhile, it may be instructive to know how the development of logistical and bureaucratic techniques made mass evacuation practicable, and how the emergence of a humanitarian consciousness made it thinkable. But the most immediate lesson of the case lies here, in the need to listen to the voices of the people who are being evacuated.

NOTES

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1. International Organization for Migration, "Humanitarian Evacuation on the Libyan Border, 28 February 2011–28 May 2011. Three-month Report on IOM's Response" (Geneva, 2011), 2, accessed October 17, 2016, http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MENA3Month%20Report_finalversionf.pdf The evacuation of nationals of another state or states is obviously distinct from states' evacuation—or deportation—of their own subjects and citizens in wartime.

2. Briefing by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations high commissioner for refugees, to the

United Nations Security Council, New York, May 5, 1999, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68fc14.html

3. A recent publication by the Global Protection Cluster mentions that "compelling examples can be cited from the Second World War and the Bosnian War" before discussing recent evacuations of Syrian and Central African Republic refugees: *Humanitarian Evacuations in Armed Conflict*, thematic round table, November 2014, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/news_and_publications/GPC-Seminar-Summary_Conclusions-04_2015-screen.pdf. On Operation Babylift, see Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, "Operation Babylift or Babyabduction? Implications of the Hague Convention on the Humanitarian Evacuation and 'rescue' of Children," *International Social Work*, no. 52 (2009): 621–33. See also Kevin Minh Allen, "Operation Baby Lift: An Adoptee's Perspective," *The Humanist*, April 15, 2009, accessed October 17, 2016, http://thehumanist.com/magazine/may-june-2009/features/operation-baby-lift-an-adoptees-perspective. The story of the Kindertransport is well known academically and publicly: to give an example local to this author, Kindertransport testimonies feature prominently in the Scottish Jewish Archives Centre's collections and outreach activities on the Holocaust era, and in the oral history interviews collected by the "Gathering the Voices" project, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.sjac.org.uk/holocaust/ and http://www.gatheringthevoices.com/. The Spanish refugee children are also reasonably well known: see the website of the Basque Children of '37 Association UK, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.basquechildren.org/, which includes a bibliography of scholarly and popular work in English and Spanish. For another example of "child rescue," see Michal Ostrovsky, " 'We Are Standing By': Rescue Operations of the United States Committee for the Care of European Children," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 230–50.

4. This work began almost immediately after the evacuation; see Alice Bloch, "Kosovan Refugees in the UK: The Rolls Royce or Rickshaw Reception?" *Forced Migration Review*, no. 5 (August 1999): 24–6, and Joanne van Selm, ed., *Kosovo's Refugees in the European Union* (London: Pinter, 2000).

5. Studies following the Kosovo evacuees in several resettlement countries focus particularly on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): Amy L. Ai, Christopher Peterson, and David Ubelhor, "War-Related Trauma and Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Adult Kosovar Refugees," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 15, no. 2 (April 2002): 157–60; S. Ekblad, H. Prochazka, and G. Roth, "Psychological Impact of Torture: A 3-month Follow-up of Mass-Evacuated Kosovan Adults in Sweden. Lessons Learnt for Prevention," *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica* 106, no. 412 (June 2002): 30–6; and Göran Roth, Solvig Ekblad, and Hans Ågrena, "A Longitudinal Study of PTSD in a Sample of Adult Mass-evacuated Kosovars, Some of Whom Returned to Their Home Country," *European Psychiatry* 21, no. 3 (April 2006): 152–59; Lynda Redwood-Campbell et al., "How Are New Refugees Doing in Canada? Comparison of the Health and Settlement of the Kosovars and Czech Roma," *Canadian Journal of Public Health/Revue Canadienne de Santé Publique* 94, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 381–85; Stuart W. Turner et al., "Mental Health of Kosovan Albanian Refugees in the UK," *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 182, no. 5 (May 2003): 444–48.

6. Jef Huysmans's "Shape-shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis," *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 3 (July 2002): 599–618, perceptively analyses the NATO alliance's "military humanitarianism" during the Kosovo crisis, but mentions the evacuation only briefly.

7. R. Charli Carpenter, "'Women and Children First': Gender, Norms, and Humanitarian Evacuation in the Balkans 1991–95," *International Organization* 57, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 661–94; Bergquist, "Operation Babylift or Babyabduction?"

8. Arthur C. Helton, *The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 183–87.

9. Eleanor Davey, "Humanitarian History in a Complex World," *Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief* 59 (May 2014): 1, accessed August 20, 2018, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8975.pdf

10. It is not intended as a criticism of Michael Barnett's influential synthesis *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011) to note that "evacuation" does not appear in the index. Nor is it covered in two valuable and wide-ranging recent collections: Fabian Klose, ed., *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Bibliographical searches in French, Spanish, and German suggest that the point holds more widely.

11. Historical work on the French occupation is highly polarized. For two good overviews that adopt a broad but not uncritical Armenian nationalist perspective, see Garabet K. Moumdjian, "Cilicia Under French Mandate, 1918–1921: Armenian Aspirations, Turkish Intrigues, and French Double Standards," in *Armenian Cilicia*, ed. Richard Hovanissian and Simon Payaslian (Los Angeles: Mazda, 2008), 457–94; and Vahé Tachjian, *La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie: Aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de l'Irak (1919–1933)* (Paris: Karthala, 2004), 9–177. From a Turkish nationalist perspective, and an explicit work of genocide denial, see Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914–1923* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010). Robert F. Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurus* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2005), published as a book in 2005, is a 1995 PhD thesis based on research going back decades earlier. Taking no line on what it calls the "Armenian issue," its main concern is to understand how a great power military occupation failed. Less caught up in present-day disputes are Sam Kaplan, "Documenting History, Historicizing Documentation: French Military Officials' Ethnological Reports on Cilicia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, no. 2 (April 2002): 344–69, and "Territorializing Armenians: Geo-texts, and Political Imaginaries in French-occupied Cilicia, 1919–1922," *History and Anthropology* 15, no. 4 (December 2004): 399–423. None of these works offers more than a brief account of the evacuation. A fuller account appears in Dzovinar Kévonian, *Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire: Les acteurs européens et la scène proche-orientale pendant L'entre-deux-guerres* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), 27–136, placing the evacuation in the context of emerging humanitarian diplomacy. Karen Nakache, "Un cas de migration forcée: les Arméniens de Cilicie en 1921," *Cahiers de la Méditerrannée* 56, no. 1 (1998): 109–30, details the flight of Armenians as a case of forced migration but does not distinguish the evacuation within that. Chris Gratien, "The Sick Mandate of Europe: Local and Global Humanitarianism in French Cilicia, 1918–1922," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 3, no. 1 (May 2016): 165–90, discusses the practices and political stakes of humanitarianism during the occupation.

12. On the economy of the region in the late Ottoman period, see Meltem Toksöz, *Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Making of the Adana-Mersin Region 1850–1908* (Leiden: Brill, 2010). On the World War I in Cilicia, see Chris Gratien and Graham Auman Pitts, "Towards an Environmental History of World War I: Human and Natural Disasters

in the Ottoman Mediterranean," in *The World During the First World War*, ed. Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremers (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2014), 237–50, esp. 243–49.

13. French foreign ministry archives, La Courneuve, Correspondance politique et commerciale, Série "E" Levant 1918–1940 (hereafter La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940), vol. 140, fol. 144: Marcel Habert to Aristide Briand, president of the council and foreign minister (December 18, 1921).

14. The region's Armenian history since medieval times is covered in Hovanissian and Payaslian, eds., *Armenian Cilicia*. On the massacres, see Bedros Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), esp. 149–72.

15. The Republic of Turkey inherited almost all of the Ottoman military and civilian bureaucracy: 93% of the Ottoman general staff and 85% of civilian bureaucrats. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 388.

16. The operations of this service are detailed in Centre des archives diplomatiques, Nantes, Mandat Syrie-Liban, 1er versement (henceforth Nantes, SL—all references are to 1er versement), boxes 319–31.

17. Nakache, "Un cas de migration forcée," 110–12, reviews the contradictory claims made about Cilicia's demography.

18. On the Greek invasion, see Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922* (London: Hurst & Co, 1998).

19. There are examples of several Armenian revenge attacks in Nantes, SL box 209, *Cilicie 1919–1921, dossier Beyrouth—Adana—1919*.

20. The website of the French embassy in Ankara introduces the agreement, without mentioning the Armenians, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.ambafrance-tr.org/Accord-d-Angora-nouveau-depart. For a critical contemporary appraisal, see Saint-Brice, "L'accord franco-turc," *Correspondance d'Orient* 14, no. 273 (November 15, 1921): 769–76.

21. Zeidner, *Tricolor over the Taurus*, 285–86.

22. On redeployment, see La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 226–7: minister of war to commander in chief of French Army of the Levant [Gouraud] (October [28], 1921). On prisoners of war, see La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 195–8: Gouraud to Ministère des Affaires étrangères (hereafter MAE), October 28, 1921, describing the handover of three officers and 595 men. "Les prisonniers français libérés," in *Correspondance d'Orient* 14, no. 272 (October 30, 1921), 764–65, mentions "about 800" prisoner in total.

23. Nantes, SL box 233, unsorted documents, *Note*, November 26, 1921.

24. The French received "moral reparation" at a short military ceremony in early January. Nantes, SL box 239, *Cilicie 1919–1921—Adana—Evacuation de la Cilicie 1921–1922*, dossier *Adana—Nov^bre 1921–Janv 1922—Commission d'évacuation de la Cilicie*. Unattributed copy of document *Hommage officiel rendu aux Cimetières français profanés*, January 6, [192]2. NB The boxes on the French withdrawal (233–40), and the dossiers they contain, have very similar if not identical titles.

25. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 195–8: Gouraud to MAE, October 28, 1921. This notes continued actions by nationalist bands around Aintab, and states that further east, "in the zone placed under the command of Nehad Pasha, commanding the 13th army corps at

Diyarbekir," Turkish troops were "aggressive and without openly attacking our troops, are stirring the populations up against us."

26. On horses, see La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fol. 56: minister of war to president of council [i.e., prime minister] and foreign minister, November 10, 1921. This material mentions the Supreme [Allied] Council's agreement of August 10, 1921. On barbed wire, see La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 93–5: minister of war to president of council and foreign minister (undated copy, but stamped as received March 28, 1921). See also Reviel Netz, *Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2004), esp. 105–27.

27. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fols. 41–2: Briand to Franklin-Bouillon, December 14, 1921.

28. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fols. 197–201: Gouraud to MAE, November 23, 1921.

29. *Courrier d'Adana* 230 (November 26, 1921); in Nantes, SL box 238, *Cilicie 1919–1921—Adana—Evacuation de la Cilicie 1921–1922*, dossier *Adana—Affaires Politiques—Revue de la Presse—1921*, subdossier *Courrier d'Adana—double*. The auction took place on November 29; the final issue of the *Courrier* was published on December 1.

30. Nantes, SL box 233, dossier *Adana—Evacuation—1921, 1922*, subdossier *Adana 1921–1922. Application de l'Accord franco-turc . . .* , text of Gouraud's proclamation, November 9, 1921.

31. The term "exodus" (*exode*) is commonly used in the French sources: before it happened, as something to be avoided; while it was happening, as something that should not have; and afterwards, to order the archives. French sources do not record the terms used by those who were fleeing, nor other populations in the places they were fleeing from and to.

32. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 152–4: Gouraud to MAE, October 1, 1921. Already, in January 1921, Robert de Caix had warned Gouraud of an "exodus of Armenians" in the event of a French withdrawal: La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 31–3: de Caix to Gouraud, January 10, 1921.

33. Nantes, SL box 234, dossier *Adana—Commission d'Evacuation Cilicie 1921*, subdossier *Laissez-Passer*. Copies of Dufieux's telegrams from November 2–19 are grouped in a slim folder within this subdossier, *Laissez-Passer—Télégrammes envoyés à Beyrouth*, in an undated document entitled *Copie de télégrammes au sujet de l'émigration (et plus particulièrement sur la question de laissez-passer* (closing parenthesis missing in the original).

34. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fol. 14: AFL to EMASO (that is, Armée française du Levant to Etat-Major de l'Armée, section d'Orient), November 26, 1921.

35. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fols. 2–3: Gouraud to MAE, November 25, 1921.

36. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fol. 42: Gouraud to MAE, November 29, 1921.

37. Nantes, SL box 235, dossier *Adana 1921—Commission d'évacuation*, 18-page *Rapport du Capitaine Carbillet, Chef du Bureau Politique et des Renseignements, sur l'Emigration en Cilicie, dans la période du 4 au 26 Novembre 1921*, November 29, 1921.

38. Details of how they travelled there, organized themselves while waiting, or were accommodated and fed, are largely absent from French sources.

39. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fols. 125–6: Witasse, French consul in Alexandria, to foreign minister, December 17, 1921. This source material gives details of the poor state of the *Pomone*, and encloses copies of related correspondence.

40. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fol. 138: MAE to HC, December 4, 1921.

41. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fols. 215–20: Franklin-Bouillon to MAE/Briand, sent December 10, 1921 from Adana, via Beirut; pages transmitted December 12/13, and all received December 13.

42. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fols. 23–8: de Caix to MAE, December 13, 1921, and fols. 41–2 and 44: telegrams from Briand to Franklin-Bouillon and Gouraud December 14, 1921.

43. A similar incident at Beirut a week or so earlier had had fewer ramifications. Gouraud could take "police measures" directly as well as negotiate with the mutinous passengers. Nonetheless, the ministry decided in this case, too, that it would be inopportune to return the refugees, and ordered Gouraud to let them disembark "and only seek to halt the exodus in the ports of Cilicia." La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fols. 4–7: Gouraud to MAE, November 25, 1921, and fol. 37: MAE (Bonnevay) to Gouraud, November 28, 1921.

44. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fols. 4–7: Gouraud to MAE, November 25, 1921.

45. MAE, *Rapport*, 19–22.

46. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fol. 1: Gouraud to MAE, November 25, 1921.

47. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 137, fols. 131–2: Curzon to French embassy in London, and enclosure, April 14, 1921.

48. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fols. 9–10: Montille to MAE, November 7, 1921.

49. See examples in La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138.

50. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fol. 48: Billy (Athens) to MAE, November 10, 1921.

51. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fol. 175: MAE to Chargé d'Affaires Rome, November 21, 1921; vol. 139, fol. 181: Jonnart to MAE, December 7, 1921.

52. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 139, fol. 176: Paul Hymans, head of Belgian bureau at League of Nations, to Léon Bourgeois, president of the Senate and French delegate to the League of Nations Council, December 6, 1921. Briand's response: vol. 140, fols. 8–10: telegram, Briand to French ambassador in Brussels, December 11, 1921. Belgian assurances: vol. 140, fols. 36–7: letter, de Margerie, French ambassador in Belgium, to Briand, December 13, 1921.

53. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fol. 55: Artinian to Armenian National Delegation, Larnaca, November 8, 1921, one of two telegrams the Delegation forwarded to MAE (fol. 53: letter, November 10, 1921) (emphasis mine).

54. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fol. 18–19: Pellé to MAE, November 8, 1921. On this subject, Pellé told Paris, "I expressed every reservation."

55. Keith David Watenpaugh, "Modern Humanitarianism and the Year of the Locust: American Relief in Palestine and Lebanon 1914–1918," in *Histories of Humanitarian Action in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Eleanor Davey and Eva Svoboda (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2014), 33–42, accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9141.pdf. See also Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Stanford: University California Press, 2015).

56. Liisa Malkki, "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization,"

Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (August 1996): 377–404, is an influential analysis of humanitarian representations of refugees as "pure victims."

57. Elsewhere in the archives of the High Commission such material is copious: for example, petitions produced by inhabitants of the mandate territories.

58. Keith Watenpaugh rightly asks, "How can we use Western state, intergovernmental, and foundation archives to write about humanitarianism in a way that does more than repackage a kind of diplomatic or institutional history in which the history of non-Western people is retold from a Eurocentric perspective? That question is raised by the fact that the amount of source material produced by humanitarian organizations and intergovernmental bodies is truly immense, and dwarfs that produced by the objects of humanitarianism themselves" (Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 23). I have tried to remain alert to the historiographical challenges he identifies here.

59. Kévonian, *Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire*, 90, quoting a document from December 23, 1921. For an example of Franklin-Bouillon making such scattergun accusations, see La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fol. 1: Franklin-Bouillon to Briand, December 11, 1921. Gouraud was not immune: La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 138, fols. 197–201: Gouraud to MAE, November 23, 1921.

60. Kévonian, *Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire*, 89.

61. Ibid., 90–91.

62. Nantes, SL box 238, dossier *Adana—Evacuation de la Cilicie—Rapport sur l'Imigration* [*sic*] *– 1919–1921*: five-page report on *La question d'une résistance à Deurt-Yol*, December 20, 1921. Briand shared the fear: La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fol. 88: Briand to Franklin-Bouillon, December 17, 1921.

63. Nantes, SL box 235, dossier *Adana 1921—Commission d'évacuation*, 18-page *Rapport du Capitaine Carbillet, Chef du Bureau Politique et des Renseignements, sur l'Emigration en Cilicie, dans la période du 4 au 26 Novembre 1921*, November 29, 1921.

64. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fols. 23–8: de Caix to MAE, December 13, 1921.

65. Nantes, SL box 237, *Cilicie 1919–1921—Adana—Evacuation de la Cilicie 1921–1922*, dossier *Adana—Commission mixte d'évacuation. 1921–1922*, letter from Dörtyol (unattributed, but from context it is clearly by Commandant De Boisse; December 22, 1921)

66. Nantes, SL box 237, *Cilicie 1919–1921—Adana—Evacuation de la Cilicie 1921–1922*, dossier *Adana—Commission mixte d'évacuation. 1921–1922*. Pettelat, *Note pour le Contrôleur Administratif du Djébel Berekett* [*sic*], Adana, November 30, 1921.

67. MAE, *Rapport sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban (juillet 1922–juillet 1923)*, Paris, 1923, 18.

68. MAE, *Rapport*, 18.

69. Nantes, SL box 237, dossier *Adana. Commission mixte d'évacuation. Correspondance Arrivée. 1921–1922*. Telephone message, Officier Liaison Mersine (i.e., Coulet) to the Commission Mixte d'Evacuation, Adana, December 19, 1921. (This document misspells "*Blak Prince*.") The *Lamartine* and *Marengo* are also mentioned in French sources: La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 140, fol. 82: Pellé to MAE, December 16, 1921; Nantes, SL box 237, dossier *Adana—Commission mixte d'évacuation. 1921–1922*. Telegram, Pettelat to HC, December 24, 1921.

70. MAE, *Rapport*, 19.

71. All documents described in this paragraph are in Nantes, SL box 238, dossier *Adana—Décembre 1921*.

72. Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 86–88; Claudena M. Skran, "Profiles of the first two High Commissioners," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 1, no. 3–4 (1988): 278–96, esp. 279–80.

73. Nantes, SL box 238, dossier *Adana—Commission d'Evacuation—1921*. Statistical tables: *Nombre de personnes ayant reçu des laissez-passer du 4 au 30 Novembre 1921* and *Nombre de personnes ayant obtenu des laissez-passer en Novembre (par race)*. I have not found any duplicates of the laissez-passer themselves in the archives. See also box 234, dossier *Adana—Commission d'Evacuation Cilicie 1921*, subdossier *Laissez-Passer*.

74. MAE, *Rapport*, 18.

75. MAE, *Rapport*, 19. On the "medicalization" of refugee populations in this period, see, for example, two pieces in Nicholas Baron and Peter Gatrell, eds., *Homelands: War, Population and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia 1918–1924* (London: Anthem Press, 2004): Gatrell, "War, Population Displacement and State Formation in the Russian Borderlands, 1914–24," 10–34, esp. 25–29, and Tomas Balkelis, "In Search of a Native Realm: The Return of World War One Refugees to Lithuania, 1918–24," 74–97, esp. 93–95.

76. Michel Foucault, "Govenmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104, esp. 99–100.

77. On the vast range of the service's activities, and the disappearance of its archive, see Pierre Fournié and François-Xavier Trégan, "Outils documentaires sur le mandat français," in *The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives/Les Mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative*, ed. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 45–53, especially 49. An overview of the situation of refugees in Syria and Lebanon in 1922–1924 is in Kévonian, *Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire*, 99–107. On refugees in mandate Syria more generally, see Benjamin Thomas White, "Refugees and the Definition of Syria, 1920–1939," *Past and Present* 235, no. 1 (May 2017): 141–78.

78. White, "Refugees and the Definition of Syria."

79. The phrase is from Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell, "Population Displacement, State-Building, and Social Identity in the Lands of the Former Russian Empire, 1917–23," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 51–100. Pioneers include Marrus, *The Unwanted*; Claudena Skran, *Refugees in Interwar Europe: the Emergence of a Regime* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). A good sense of the field's development can be gained from three edited volumes: Baron and Gatrell, eds., *Homelands*; Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron, eds., *Warlands: Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945–50* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White, eds., *The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Post-War Europe, 1944–9* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Hannah Arendt has been a key reference point for recent work: *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951). Liisa Malkki's anthropological work has been particularly valuable in understanding the relationship between displacement and nationalism: *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (February 1992):

24–44; "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 495–523; "Speechless Emissaries," 377–404.

80. There is a large body of literature on South Asia, especially at Partition: see Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); for testimonies of the displaced, Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Cabeiri Debergh Robinson, "Too Much Nationality: Kashmiri Refugees, the South Asian Refugee Regime, and a Refugee State, 1947–1974," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 3 (September 2012): 344–65; and on a later episode, Antara Datta, *Refugees and Borders in South Asia: the Great Exodus of 1971* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). On East Asia, population displacement and its effects during the Sino-Japanese war have begun to attract serious attention, see Diana Lary, *The Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stephen MacKinnon, *Wuhan 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); R. Keith Schoppa, *In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees during the Sino-Japanese War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Micah S. Muscolino, "Refugees, Land Reclamation, and Militarized Landscapes in Wartime China: Huanglongshan, Shaanxi, 1937–45," *Journal of Asian Studies* 69, no. 2 (May 2010): 453–78. The refugee crisis caused by the Korean War is much less well studied.

81. Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford, 2013).

82. The mass displacements that sent millions of Muslim refugees into the Ottoman Empire from the Caucasus and the Balkans after c.1860 have not been adequately studied in English-language scholarship. Kemal Karpat wrote a number of still valuable articles, which are included in the collected volume *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002). Justin McCarthy's important book on the subject is marred by the author's *parti pris* in the highly politicized debates on late Ottoman communal violence: *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Isa Blumi's *Ottoman Refugees: Migration in a Post-imperial World, 1878–1939* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) is not the synthetic work that might be expected from the title. The historiography on Armenian refugees has often been written from a nationalist perspective, and not fully contextualized in larger histories of displacement; a good study nonetheless is Nicola Migliorino, *(Re)Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-cultural Diversity and the State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008). The burgeoning of comparative scholarship on the Greek-Turkish population exchange from the late 1990s coincided with the growth of interest in refugee history—and the League of Nations's involvement in managing the "refugee problem"—more generally: see Renée Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus*, second edition (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998); Renée Hirschon, ed., *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003); and the excellent popular history by Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Appearing in 2004, Dzovinar Kévonian's *Réfugiés et Diplomatie Humanitaire* was a pioneering study of Middle Eastern refugees' place in the "humanitarian diplomacy" of the interwar period, with a keen eye for French attempts to instrumentalize the refugee issue to further broader political aims in the region. The Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967—an important case, but often exceptionalized—were for a long time the Middle Eastern

refugee population most studied by historians. See Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–49* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and its revised second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Middle East historians are now addressing displacement more fully, especially for the late and post-Ottoman periods, and a more synthetic approach is becoming possible: see Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Dawn Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Laura Robson, *States of Separation: Transfer, Partition, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).

83. Aristide Zolberg, "The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 467, no. 1 (May 1983): 24–38.

84. The term "haven nationalism" is from Şener Aktürk and Adnan Naseemullah, "Carving Nation from Confession: Haven Nationalism and Religious Backlash in Turkey, Israel, and Pakistan," APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, accessed October 17, 2016, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1449143

85. Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*.

86. La Courneuve, Levant 1918–1940, vol. 135, fols. 11–13: *Note N 1, Directive Générale*, n.d. but marked (in handwriting) *Classé le 26 Janvier 1919*. This foresees, and proposes "facilitating," the emigration of various Muslim populations.

87. Jef Huysmans makes a similar point about NATO's humanitarian actions during the Kosovo war: "The logistical technologies and skills that have been developed for use in a military field structured around war can be easily transplanted into a humanitarian field that is structured around the assistance and protection of victims": "Shape-shifting NATO," 606.

88. H. H. Austin, *The Baqubah Refugee Camp: an Account of Work on Behalf of the Persecuted Assyrian Christians* (London: The Faith Press, 1920), 3; La Courneuve, Service français de la Société des Nations, 1917–1940, volume 1792, folios 032 (letter from president of council [i.e., prime minister] Poincaré to minister of war, October 25, 1922) and 047, letter from minister of war to president of council and foreign minister, November 17, 1922.

89. Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 200.

90. The best-known book on this subject is Franz Werfel's 1933 novel *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, recently reissued in an expanded English translation (Boston: Verba Mundi, 2012).

91. Paul Robinson, *The White Russian Army in Exile 1920–1941* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 31–32.

92. Zeidner, *Tricolor over the Taurus*, 286.

93. Huysmans, "Shape-shifting NATO."

94. Ibid., 613: humanitarian action on their behalf was politically necessary in a "symbolic struggle for reputation and honourability" (600).

95. Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

96. Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City* (New York: Newmark Press, 1998), 190–98; Giles Milton, *Paradise Lost: Smyrna 1922: the Destruction of Islam's*

City of Tolerance (London: Basic Books, 2008), 352–71; Michelle Tusan, *Smyrna's Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 146–53.

97. In the same way, Huysmans observes that the Kosovo refugees themselves triggered the emergence of a humanitarian field: "Shape-shifting NATO," 604.

98. Ronald W. Perry and Michael K. Lindell, "Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guidelines for the Emergency Planning Process," *Disasters* 27, no. 4 (December 2003): 336–50, esp. 341.

99. Astri Suhrke, Michael Barutciski, Peta Sandison, and Rick Garlock, "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response," (Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2000), accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=3ba0bbeb4. Compare a contemporary Amnesty International report that was critical of the evacuation programme: it opens with extended refugee testimony and explores the humanitarian response to the crisis from the perspective of the refugees themselves. Amnesty International, "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Humanitarian Evacuation and the International Response to Refugees from Kosovo" (Amnesty International, 1999), accessed October 17, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/148000/eur650051999en.pdf

100. International Organization for Migration, "Humanitarian Evacuation on the Libyan Border," esp. section IV. I would like to thank Jeff Crisp for the references in this paragraph.